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Brokers-REAL ESTATEBROKERS'DUTIESTO PROSPECTIVE
U. Tifft, 515 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1975).
PURCHASERS-Funk
Benjamin and Betty Lou Funk inquired a t the office of Ward
Tifft, a licensed real estate broker in Idaho, about purchasing
some real property. A salesman showed them certain property
listed with the Tifft Agency. The following day, the Funks wrote
a check for $100 to the Tifft Agency as an earnest-money deposit
and signed an agreement to purchase the property for $30,000,
with $1,000 to be paid upon acceptance of the offer and "payments of $100 per month for fifteen months, followed by a lump
sum payment of $5,000 and payments of $150 per month thereafter."' Tifft mailed the Funk offer to the owner, but before the
owner received that offer, Tifft called the owner and stated that
he and two of his business associates were mailing an offer of
$30,000 for the same property, with terms of $6,000 down and
payments of $300 per month. The owner accepted the offer of
Tifft and his associates. A month later, in response to a telephone
call from the Funks, Tifft returned the $100 earnest-money deposit and informed the Funks that their offer had been rejected.
Upon learning that Tifft had purchased the property, the
Funks sued to have Tifft and his associates declared constructive
trustees of the property with the Funks as beneficiaries. The
United States District Court for the District of Idaho dismissed
their complaint. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Tifft had breached
the fiduciary duties he owed the Funks, and directed the imposition of a constructive trust.

Traditionally, the real estate buyer-seller relationship has
been one of caveat emptor.* Since the broker in a real estate
transaction is usually the seller's agent, the buyer-broker rela1. Funk v. Tifft, 515 F.2d 23, 24 (9th Cir. 1975).
L.J. 369
2. See Comment, Caveat Emptor! The Doctrine's Stronghold, 1WILLAMEVE
(1960). Courts are increasingly abandoning the doctrine of caveat emptor in the sales of
new homes by builder-vendors. See generally Young & Harper, Quaere: Caveat Emptor
or Caveat Venditor?, 24 ARK. L. REV.245 (1970); Note, Commercial Law-Implied Warranties in Sales of Real Estate-The Trend to Abolish Caveat Emptor, 22 DE PAULL. REV.
510 (1972); Note, Caveat Emptor and the Morals of the Housing Market, 20 N.Y.L.F. 803
(1975). Congressional legislation has also reduced the impact of caveat emptor on certain
subdivision land sales. See Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. (j 170120 (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1701-03 (Supp. IVY1974); Comment, Protecting the
Buyer: New Regulations Under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 1974 WIS.
L. REV.558.

513

514

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1976:

tionship has also been one of caveat e m p t ~ rConsequently,
.~
real
estate brokers historically have not had any fiduciary or affirmative obligations to prospective purchaser^.^ Courts have generally
held brokers liable to buyers only when the broker was acting as
the buyer's agent5or when the buyer could prove fraud on the part
of the broker?
Contrary to the traditional rule of caveat emptor, however,
some modern courts have held that although the real estate broker is primarily the seller's agent, the broker nevertheless has
3. Huttig v. Nessy, 100 Fla. 1097, 130 So. 605 (1930); Ripy v. Cronan, 131 Ky. 631,
115 S.W. 791 (1909); McLennan v. Investment Exch. Co., 170 Mo. App. 389, 156 S.W.
730 (1913); Linnemann v. Summers, 95 N.J. Eq. 507, 123 A. 539 (Ch. 1924); Comment, A
Reexamination of the Real Estate Broker-Buyer-Seller Relationship, 18 WAYNE
L. REV.
1343, 1345 (1972).
Usually both the real estate seller and his agent deal a t arm's length with the purchaser. 35 BOST.U.L. REV.604, 607 (1955). A real estate broker hired by the owner of land
OF AGENCY
$
to find a purchaser is ordinarily the owner's agent. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
13b (1958).
The real estate broker-seller relationship is fiduciary in nature. See, e.g., Reese v.
Harper, 8 Utah 2d 119, 329 P.2d 410 (1958). The broker owes his principal, the seller, the
duties of loyalty, skill, and full disclosure. He cannot act for persons having interests
adverse to those of the seller without the seller's consent. See, e.g., Schepers v. Lautenschlager, 173 Neb. 107, 112 N.W.2d 767 (1962). Thus, historically, a real estate broker has
been bound to act for his principal alone, using utmost good faith in his principal's behalf.
See Lister v. Sakwinski, 206 Mich. 121, 172 N.W. 397 (1919).
4. Fish v. Teninga, 330 Ill. 160, 161 N.E. 515 (1928); Ries v. Rome, 337 Mass. 376,
149 N.E.2d 366 (1958); Latson v. Buck, 89 Neb. 28, 130 N.W. 970 (1911); Buckley v.
Hatupin, 198 Wash. 543, 89 P.2d 212 (1939); see Sanders v. Stevens, 23 Ariz. 370, 203 P.
1083 (1922); Wilkes v. Rankin-Whitten Realty Co., 65 Ga. App. 341, 16 S.E.2d 170 (1941);
Ripy v. Cronan, 131 Ky. 631, 115 S.W. 791 (1909); DiBurro v. Bonasia, 321 Mass. 12, 71
N.E.2d 401 (1947); cf. Klotz v. Fauber, 213 Va. 1, 189 S.E.2d 45 (1972).
5. Pouppirt v. Greenwood, 48 Colo. 405, 110 P. 195 (1910); Rogers v. Genung, 76 N.J.
Eq. 306, 74 A. 473 (Ct. Err. & App. 1909); Stephenson v. Golden, 279 Mich. 710,276 N.W.
849 (1937); Mitchell v. Allison, 54 N.M. 56, 213 P.2d 231 (1949); Rice v. First Nat'l Bank,
50 N.M. 99, 171 P.2d 318 (1946); Johnson v. Nippert, 294 Pa. 464,144 A. 404 (1928); Volz
v. William D. Burkheimer, Inc., 173 Wash. 49, 21 P.2d 285 (1933); cf., Coover v. Cox, 95
Cal. App. 1, 272 P. 343 (2d Dist. 1928).
6. Dunshee v. Novotny, 77 Colo. 6, 233 P. 1114 (1925); Lear v. Bawden, 75 Colo. 385,
225 P. 831 (1924); Isenbeck v. Burroughs, 217 Mass. 537, 105 N.E. 595 (1914); Hokanson
v. Oatman, 165 Mich. 512, 131 N.W. 111 (1911); Sawyer v. Tildahl, 275 Minn. 457, 148
N.W.2d 131 (1967); Collins v. Philadelphia Oil Co., 97 W. Va. 464, 125 S.E. 223 (1924);
Booker v. Pelkey, 173 Wis. 24, 180 N.W. 132 (1920). The courts are not in agreement as
to what facts rise to the level of actionable fraud. For example, in Sanders v. Stevens, 23
Ariz. 370, 376, 203 P. 1083, 1085 (1922), the court stated that "a false representation as to
the owner's lowest price is not actionable, because it is not a representation of a material
fact." The court in Collins v. Philadelphia Oil Co., 97 W. Va. 464, 470, 125 S.E. 223, 225
(1924), however, held that such a misrepresentation did constitute fraud and stated that
a buyer has a right to rely on the broker's statement of the seller's minimum price. In some
cases where a broker has been held liable for misrepresenting the seller's price, the courts
have noted that the buyer was inexperienced and unfamiliar with real estate values. See,
e.g., Hokanson v. Oatman, 165 Mich. 512, 131 N.W. 111 (1911).
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certain duties to a potential buyer to deal honestly and fairly with
him and to communicate accurately the buyer's offer and the
seller's price. Courts have held brokers liable for breach of these
affirmative duties to buyers in cases where the broker has undertaken to act on behalf of the buyer,' concealed or failed to communicate the buyer's offer,8 or made damaging misrepresentations to the buyer concerning the seller's price.g These courts
have based their conclusions that real estate brokers owe potential buyers certain obligations on either of two theories: (1) a
fiduciary relationship exists between the broker and the buyer,'"
or (2) public policy requires brokers to act in an honest and ethical manner toward potential buyers."
A.

Fiduciary Relationshipt2

The Supreme Courts of Florida and Connecticut have held
7. Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419 (1927); cf. Van Woy v. Willis, 153 Fla.
189, 14 So. 2d 185 (1943) (broker's extensive involvement with buyer's transactions); Siler
v. Gunn, 177 Ga. App. 325, 160 S.E. 2d 427 (1968) (dual agency). See also note 5 supra.
8. Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959); Harper v. Adametz, 142
Conn. 218, 113 A.2d 136 (1955); Zichlin v. Dill, 157 Fla. 96, 25 So. 2d 4 (1946); Van Woy
v. Willis, 153 Fla. 189, 14 So. 2d 185 (1943); Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419
(1927); Amato v. Latter & Blum, Inc., 227 La. 537, 79 So. 2d 873 (1955).
9. Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959); Harper v. Adametz, 142
Conn. 218, 113 A.2d 136 (1955); Zichlin v. Dill, 157 Fla. 96, 25 So. 2d 4 (1946); Van Woy
v. Willis, 153 Fla. 189, 14 So. 2d 185 (1943); Siler v. Gunn, 117 Ga. App. 325, 160 S.E.2d
427 (1968).
10. Harper v. Adametz, 142 Conn. 218, 113 A.2d 136 (1955); Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla.
805, 113 So. 419 (1927); Siler v. Gunn, 117 Ga. App. 325, 160 S.E.2d 427 (1968); cf. Van
Woy v. Willis, 153 Fla. 189, 14 So. 2d 185 (1943) (broker owes buyer duties, although the
court did not expressly find a fiduciary relationship); Stevens v. Reilly, 56 Okla. 455, 156
P. 157 (1916) (confidential relation).
11. Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959); Zichlin v. Dill, 157 Fla. 96,
25 So. 2d 4 (1946); Amato v. Latter & Blum, Inc., 227 La. 537, 79 So. 2d 873 (1955).
12. The Restatement defines a fiduciary as
a person having a duty, created by his undertaking to act primarily for the
benefit of another in matters connected with his undertaking. Among the
agent's fiduciary duties to the principal is the duty to account for profits arising
out of the employment, the duty not to act as, or on account of, an adverse party
without the principal's consent, the duty not to compete with the principal on
his own account or for another in matters relating to the subject matter of the
agency, and the duty to deal fairly with the principal in all transactions between
them.
OF AGENCY
§ 13a (1958). Bogert gives a similar definition of the
RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
duties of a fiduciary:
[Fiduciaries] must employ the principal's property for his benefit . . . . They
are held to the highest amount of good faith, are required to exclude all selfish
interest, ?re prohibited from putting themselves in positions where personal
interest and representative interest will conflict, and must, in any direct dealing
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real estate brokers liable for affirmative misrepresentations and
for failure to communicate the buyer's offer by concluding that a
fiduciary relationship exists between the broker and a potential
buyer.I3 In Quinn v. Phipps,l"he Florida court found that the
broker's fiduciary duties arose from the buyer's reliance on the
broker's oral agreement to communicate the buyer's offer and to
negotiate with the seller on the buyer's behalf. The court reasoned
that a real estate broker invites public confidence,'%nd that a
fiduciary relationship should be found wherever influence is acquired and abused or confidence is reposed and betrayed? The
court rejected the broker's argument that since he had been employed by the seller, he could not at the same time have been an
agent for the buyer. The court asserted that even if the broker had
been the seller's agent, his exclusive contract to sell the property
would not have conflicted with his agreement to submit the
buyer's offer.17 By concealing the buyer's $50,000 offer and purchasing the property for himself for $45,000,1Rthe broker breached
a fiduciary duty to the buyer. The court accordingly upheld a
constructive trust on the land for the buyer's benefit?
the Florida court relied
In a later case, Van Woy v. Willi~,~O
on Quinn's broad definition of a fiduciary relationship to find that
with the principal, make full disclosure of all relevant facts and give the latter
an opportunity to obtain independent advice.
G.G. BOGERT& G.T. BOGERT,THE LAWOF TRUSTSAND TRUSTEES
§ 481 (2d ed. 1964)
(footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as BOGERT].
13. Harper v. Adametz, 142 Conn. 218, 113 A.2d 136 (1955); Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla.
805, 113 So. 419 (1927); cf. Van Woy v. Willis, 153 Fla. 189, 14 So. 2d 185 (1943).
14. 93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419 (1927).
15. 93 Fla. at 815, 113 So. a t 422.
16. Id. a t 808-12, 113 So. a t 420-21. The court further stated that "[tlhe origin of
the confidence is immaterial. The rule embraces both technical fiduciary relations and
those informal relations which exist wherever one man trusts in and relies upon another."
Id. a t 809-10, 113 So. a t 421 (citations omitted).
The Quinn court seems to conclude that fiduciary and confidential relations are
synonymous. Other courts have distinguished these two terms, defining "fiduciary relation" as being applicable only to legal relationships between parties-such as guardian
and ward, administrator and heirs, trustee and cestui que trust, and principal and
agent-while finding that the term "confidential relation" covers all other relationships
"wherein confidence is rightfully reposed and . . . exercised." Roberts v. Parsons, 195 Ky.
$ 5 481, 482.
274, 278, 242 S.W. 594, 596 (1922); BOGERT
17. 93 Fla. a t 820, 113 So. a t 424. The court further stated that "[ilf there were
reasons known to [the broker] why he could not carry out his agreement with [the
buyer], it was his duty to fully disclose such reasons to [the buyer]." Id. at 820-21, 113
So. a t 424.
18. Id. a t 811-12, 113 So. a t 421.
19. Id. a t 828, 113 So. a t 427.
20. 153 Fla. 189, 14 So. 2d 185 (1943).
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the broker owed the buyer certain duties which were fiduciary in
nature,21despite the fact that he was not the buyer's agent.22The
broker in Van Woy had falsely represented to the buyer that he
was the seller's exclusive agent. Then, after misrepresenting that
the property could not be purchased for less than $75,000,20the
broker used the buyer's money to purchase the property for himself for $37,500 and resold it to the buyer for $75,000.24The court
found that the broker's duties to the buyer arose from the broker's
extensive involvement in helping the buyer purchase the propertye2"
' Connecticut Supreme Court
In Harper v. A d a r n e t ~ , ~the
found a fiduciary relationship between the broker and the buyer2?
even though the broker had clearly been employed by the seller.2R
The broker had fraudulently misrepresented the seller's minimum price and failed to communicate the buyer's offer. After
purchasing the property for himself, the broker resold a small
part of the property to the buyer, telling him that the seller had
decided to retain the balance of the property in his family.29Although the broker was not the buyer's agent, the court concluded
that the buyer had a right to assume that the broker would both
"deal honestly with him and be faithful to his principal [the
seller]."30 The court held that the broker's conduct had been
fraudulent and that the broker had breached the fiduciary duties
21. Id. a t 199-203, 14 So. 2d a t 190-192.
The V a n Woy court discussed various authorities and cases concerning the obligations
on the broker that result from agency and fiduciary relationships. After reviewing the
broker's dealings with the buyer, the court concluded that even "if [the broker] was not
the agent of the [buyer] in these several transactions, certainly he was due her certain
duties and obligations, arising out of the relationship then existing between them." Id. a t
203, 14 So. 2d a t 192. The court did not, however, expressly find a fiduciary relationship
between the broker and the buyer.
22. Id. a t 198-99, 14 So. 2d a t 190.
23. Id. at 191, 14 So. 2d a t 186.
24. Id. a t 195-96, 14 So. 2d a t 188-89.
25. The broker accepted the buyer's check in downpayment on the property, represented her a t the closing, and assisted her in obtaining and refinancing a loan for the
purchase of the property. Id. a t 203, 14 So. 2d a t 192.
26. 142 con;. 218,113 A.2d 136 (1955).
27. The Harper court stated:
[Elquity has carefully refrained from defining a fiduciary relationship in precise detail and in such a manner as to exclude new situations. It has left the
bars down for situations in which there is a justifiable trust confided on one side
and a resulting superiority and influence on the other.
Id. lt 225, 113 A.2d a t 139 (citations omitted).
28. Id. a t 221-22, 113 A.2d a t 138.
29. Id. a t 220-23, 113 A.2d a t 137-38.
30. Id. a t 224, 113 A.2d a t 139.
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he owed to the buyer? Therefore, the court upheld a constructive
trust on the "retained" property in favor of the buyer.:'2
In these three cases, the brokers had dealt dishonestly with
prospective purchasers by making significant misrepresentations
and by concealing the purchasers' offers. The courts in each of
these cases, however, had little evidence upon which to base a
finding of a fiduciary relationship between the broker and buyer.
In Quinn, the broker's agreement merely to communicate the
buyer's offer and to negotiate with the seller on the buyer's behalf
was held to be sufficient grounds for finding a fiduciary relationship. The court in Van Woy found that the broker's extensive
involvement in helping the buyer purchase the property imposed
on him affirmative obligations to the buyer. In Harper, the court
found a fiduciary relationship between the broker and the buyer
despite the absence of even these tenuous bases. Thus, it appears
t h a t the courts in all three cases strained to find fiduciary
relationships upon which to hold the dishonest brokers accountable to the buyers. The facts in Quinn and Van Woy apparently
did not rise to the level of actionable fraud. In Harper, however,
although it had concluded that the broker's actions were fraudulent," the court further found a breach of a fiduciary relationship.
Apparently as the result of the brokers' extremely unethical and
31. Id. a t 224-26, 113 A.2d a t 139. A vigorous dissent asserted that the broker had no
duties to refrain from buying the property himself or to disclose to the buyer that he had
bought the property, inasmuch as the broker was admittedly not the buyer's agent and
the facts did not support the existence of any confidential relationship between the parties. The dissent further rejected the majority's conclusion that the buyer had been defrauded since the buyer had not sustained any actual damage. Id. a t 226-28, 113 A.2d at
140-41.
32. Id. a t 224-26, 113 A.2d a t 139.
It has been suggested that the Connecticut court strained in Harper to find a fiduciary
relationship between the broker and the buyer in order to impose a constructive trust. See
35 BOST.U.L. REV.604,605-06 (1955). It appears that the Harper court had little evidence
from which to find a fiduciary relationship and that the court failed to consider the
conflicts and problems resulting from such a finding. The court did not, however, have to
find a fiduciary relationship in order to impose a constructive trust for the benefit of the
purchaser since it had already concluded that the broker had defrauded the buyer. 142
Conn. a t 223-24, 113 A.2d a t 138-39.
A constructive trust is a remedy devised for the purpose of furthering justice and
frustrating fraud. Fraud in this context includes all conduct which is "unfair, unconscionable, and unjust." Whenever equity finds a wrongful retention of property,
it will give relief, whether the type of injustice is new or old. The court does not
restrict itself by naming all the specific forms of inequitable holding which will
move it, but rather reserves complete liberty to apply this remedy to whatever
knavery human ingenuity can invent.
BOGERT
§ 471 (footnotes omitted).
33. See note 32 supra.
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dishonest conduct, the Florida and Connecticut courts were persuaded to find the broker-buyer relationships in these cases were
fiduciary in nature.34

B. Public Policy
In cases with facts similar to the three cases discussed above,
the Supreme Courts of Florida, California, and Louisiana concluded that although a fiduciary relationship did not exist between the broker and buyer, public policy, as expressed in the
state statutes, requires brokers to act in an honest and ethical
These courts found that brokers owe
manner toward
duties to potential buyers as members of the public because of the
status given to, and responsibilities imposed on, licensed real
estate brokers by the state statutes. Affirmative misrepresentation and a failure to communicate the buyer's offer were held
to constitute a breach of the broker's statutory duty to deal fairly
and honestly with prospective purchasers.
In Zichlin v. Dill,36the broker allegedly had falsely told the
buyer that the seller's minimum price was $5,500. The broker
then made a $1,000 secret profit by purchasing the property for
himself with the buyer's money and then reselling it to the
The Supreme Court of Florida concluded that a real estate broker is an exception to the general rule that an agent is
responsible only to his principal, and reversed the lower court's
dismissal of the complaint. The court noted that a real estate
broker in Florida enjoys statutory privileges and responsibilities,
citing a Florida statute that requires applicants for a brokerage
license to be honest, trustworthy, of good character, and fair.3RIn
-

-

-

34. See 35 BOST.U.L. Rev. 604, 45-08 (1955).
35. Cases cited note 11 supra.
36. 157 Fla. 96, 25 So. 2d 4 (1946).
37. Id. a t 97, 25 So. 2d a t 4. Furthermore, "[tlhe broker induced [the buyer] not
to engage an attorney to represent her in closing the transaction saying he would attend
to all details and record the deed." Two weeks after the closing, the buyer learned that
she had taken a deed to the property from the broker, not the original seller. Id.
38. FLA.STAT.ANN.§ § 475.01 to .49 (1941), as amended, FLA.STAT.ANN.$ 5 475.01
to .49 (Supp. 1975-76). The Zichlin court quoted § 475.17 from the 1941 Florida Statutes:
"All applicants who are natural persons shall be competent, honest, truthful, trustworthy,
of good character, and bear a reputation for fair dealing . . . ." That section now reads:
An applicant for registration . . . shall be required to make it appear. . . [that
he] intends [to be] . . . honest, truthful, trustworthy, of good character, and
that he bears a good reputation for fair dealing. An applicant . . . shall be
required to make it appear that he is competent and qualified to make real
estate transactions and conduct negotiations therefor with safety to investors
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the court's view, the state law "granted [brokers] a form of
monopoly, and in doing so the old rule of caveat emptor is cast
aside. Those dealing with a licensed broker may naturally assume
that he possesses the requisites of an honest, ethical man.""'
~ " real estate broker
In a California case, Ward v. T ~ g g a r t ,the
misrepresented to a prospective buyer both the seller's minimum
price and that the broker was the seller's agent. The broker used
the buyer's money to purchase the property himself; then he resold it to the buyer a t a profit." The court held that, despite the
absence of a fiduciary or agency relationship between the broker
and the buyer, public policy would not allow the broker to fraudulently take advantage of a potential buyer.j2 The court, relying on
certain California statutes concerning real estate brokersJ" and
fraudulent conduct,44stated that a licensed real estate broker has
a "duty to be honest and truthful in his dealings."VJnder California law, an applicant for a brokerage license may be required
to submit proof of his honesty and good reputation.16 Furthermore, a broker's license may be revoked if he is guilty of
"[mlaking any false promises of a character likely to influence,
persuade, or induce ."47
The broker in Arnato v. Latter & Blum, Inc.j8 failed to communicate to the seller the plaintiff-buyer's offer of $9,500; then
the seller accepted an offer of $9,250. Consequently, the plaintiff,
needing the property for the expansion of his business, could not
and to those with whom he may undertake a refationship of trust and confidence

....

9,

FLA.STAT.ANN. § 475.17 (Supp. 1975-76).
39. 157 Fla. a t 98, 25 So. 2d at 4-5.
40. 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959).
41. Id. a t 739-40, 336 P.2d a t 536.
42. Id. a t 741, 336 P.2d a t 537.
43. CAL.BUS.& PROF.CODE§ § 10150, 10176 (West 1964), as amended, CAL.BUS.&
PROF.CODE$ 8 10150, 10176 (West Supp. 1975); see note 46 infra.
44. "No one can take advantage of his own wrong." CAL.CIV. CODE4 3517 (West
1970). "One who gains a thing by fraud . . . or other wrongful act, is, unless he has some
other and better right thereto, an involuntary trustee of the thing gained, for the benefit
of the person who would otherwise have had it." Id. § 2224.
45. 51 Cal. 2d a t 741, 336 P.2d a t 537.
46. The Ward court relied on CAL. BUS. & PROF.CODE$ 10150 (West 1964), which
required that a n applicant for a brokerage license submit with his application two recommendations certifying that the applicant was "honest, truthful and of good reputation."
Section 10150 has since been amended, deleting that requirement for applicants. However,
10152 has continued to require that, a t the request of the commissioner, an applicant
must submit proof of his "honesty, truthfulness and good reputation." CAL.BUS.& PROF.
CODE§ 10152 (West Supp. 1975).
47. CAL.BUS.& PROF.CODE§ 10176(a), (b) (West Supp. 1975).
48. 227 La. 537, 79 So. 2d 873 (1955).
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acquire the property from the new owner for less than $25,000.-'"
The Louisiana Supreme Court, reversing the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, stated that under Louisiana statutes5('
brokers owe legal duties to buyers as members of the public?
These statutes require the State Real Estate Board to inquire into
the honesty, truthfulness, and reputation of all applicants for
brokerage licenses,52and further required the broker to "honestly
conduct his business and pay all damages which may result from
his actions as a real estate broker or from the actions of his salesmen. "53
The causes of action sustained in both Zichlinu and Ward
were based on allegations that the brokers had misrepresented
the sellers' prices, concealed the buyers' offers, and used the buyers' money to make secret profits for themselves. The court in
Amato, however, held that a broker may be liable to a buyer for
damages resulting from a mere failure to convey the buyer's offer,
even though the broker's conduct in that case did not appear to
be fraudulent. Thus, a broker's implied statutory duty to act in
an honest and ethical manner may extend beyond liability for
affirmative misrepresentations and concealment of a buyer's offer
to entail liability for a failure to accurately and immediately
convey a buyer's offer, regardless of the buyer's ability to prove
fraud.
49. Id. at 539-40, 79 So. 2d at 874.
50. LA. REV.STAT.ANN.§ § 37:1431-59 (1974).
51. 227 La. a t 540-43, 79 So. 2d at 874-76.
52. LA. REV.STAT.ANN.§ § 37:1438(3), 1438.1 (1974).
53. Id. 4 37:1447.
The Amato court quoted further from the Louisiana statutes to justify their decision,
227 La. a t 541, 79 So. 2d at 875:
Anyone who is injured or damaged by the broker or his salesmen by any
wrongful act done in the furtherance of such business or by any fraud or misrepresentation by the salesmen or broker may sue for the recovery of the damage
. . . . [LA.REV.STAT.ANN.§ 37:1447 (1974)l
The dissent in Amato argued that although these statutes were enacted by the Louisiana legislature "in the interest and for the protection of the public," the statutes, particularly § 37:1447, were only intended to protect those members of the general public to whom
the agent or broker owed a duty either pursuant to a contract or by operation of law. The
broker in Amato did not owe any duties to the buyer, for "[nlo language is contained
[in the statutes] indicating an intention to impose new or additional duties on real
estate agents or to create relationships between them and other parties not theretofore in
effect." 227 La. at 544-45,79 So. 2d a t 876 (dissenting opinion). For a casenote supporting
the dissent on this point see 69 HARV.L. REV.559 (1956).
54. In Zichlin, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed a lower court dismissal of the
plaintiffs complaint. 157 Fla. 96, 25 So. 2d 4 (1946).
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C. Traditional View
Many courts have not yet departed from the traditional view
of the broker-buyer relationship that the broker owes no fiduciary
duty to a potential buyer. Some of these courts have refused to
extend the broker's liability to potential buyers in cases with facts
similar to those discussed above." For example, in Ries v. Rome,56
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts adhered to the traditional view. The broker misrepresented to the buyer the status
of certain property, took advantage of confidential information
the buyer had communicated to him, and sold the property to an
associated broker.57The court denied relief to the would-be buyers and held that the brokers, as agents of the sellers, owed no
fiduciary duties to the buyers.58
In Klotz v. Fauber," the broker failed to transmit the buyer's
offer to the seller and purchased the land for himself."The Supreme Court of Virginia refused to hold the broker liable. The
court cited Quinn,(' Harper,62am at^,^^ and WardMfor the limited
rule that a broker is liable to a buyer for failure to communicate
the buyer's offer only when the broker purchases the property a t
a price equal to or less than the price the prospective buyer agreed
to pay.65Since the plaintiff-buyer in Klotz had not alleged that
his offer equaled or exceeded the price the broker paid, the court
affirmed the dismissal of his complaint. Apparently, the Virginia
court concurred in the Quinn, Harper, Amato, and Ward holdings
but, unwilling to wholly abandon the rule of caveat emptor by
further extensions of a broker's liability to purchasers, the court
distinguished the case a t bar on its facts.
Despite reluctance by some courts to depart from the traditional view, however, it appears that prior to Funk v. Tifft courts
55. Note 4 supra.
56. 337 Mass. 376, 149 N.E.2d 366 (1958).
57. Id. a t 377-79, 149 N.E.2d at 368-69.
58. Id. a t 377, 381-82, 149 N.E.2d at 368, 370-71.
59. 213 Va. 1, 189 S.E.2d 45 (1972).
60. Id. a t 1-2, 189 S.E.2d a t 45.
61. Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419 (1927). Discussed notes 14-19 and
accompanying text supra.
62. Harper v. Adametz, 142 Conn. 218, 113 A.2d 136 (1955). Discussed notes 26-32
and accompanying text supra.
63. Amato v. Latter & Blum, Inc., 227 La. 537,79 So. 2d 873 (1955). Discussed notes
48-53 and accompanying text supra.
64. Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736,336 P.2d 534 (1959). Discussed notes 40-47 and
accompanying text supra.
65. 213 Va. at 2, 189 S.E.2d a t 45.
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have been increasingly inclined to extend a real estate broker's
liability to buyers. Based on either a fiduciary duty or a duty
implied from statutes pertaining to brokers, some courts have
imposed upon real estate brokers a duty to deal honestly and
fairly with prospective purchasers. Liability has been imposed in
cases where the broker has made affirmative misrepresentations
to the prospective buyer or has concealed or failed to communicate the buyer's offer to the seller. Funk v. Tifft is a further
extension of a real estate broker's liability to prospective purchasers.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held in Funk v. Tifft that the broker, Tifft, had breached his
fiduciary duties of fairness and honesty when he outbid the Funks
without notice to them before the seller had acted on their offer.
In so holding, the court followed the modern trend of imposing
upon real estate brokers a duty of fairness and honesty in their
dealings with prospective buyers?
The Ninth Circuit relied primarily on the case of Quinn v.
P h i p p ~ wherein
,~~
the Supreme Court of Florida imposed fiduciary duties on a broker who had agreed to communicate a buyer's
offer and had further agreed to negotiate with the seller on the
buyer's behalf. The court in the present case viewed the Quinn
decision as controlling, stating that Quinn had held that when a
broker undertakes to act as an intermediary between a seller and
a prospective buyer and then purchases the property himself
without notice to the buyer, the broker becomes a constructive
trustee for the benefit of the buyer?
66. 515 F.2d a t 25 (9th Cir. 1975).
67. 93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419 (1927). Discussed notes 14-19 and accompanying text
supra.
Three additional cases were cited, but were not discussed: Mitchell v. Allison, 54
N.M. 56, 213 P.2d 231 (1949); Stephenson v. Golden, 279 Mich. 710,276 N.W. 849 (1937);
and Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959). In Mitchell, the buyer had
employed the broker to purchase certain property for him a t $3 an acre. The court held
the broker liable when he secretly purchased the property for himself a t a higher price
and then resold it to others. 54 N.M. a t 59-61, 213 P.2d a t 233-34. In Stephenson, the court
found that the broker who had been hired by the buyer had violated his duty of loyalty
by purchasing the property for himself. The court held the broker to be a constructive
trustee for the buyer's benefit. 279 Mich. a t 731, 734-46, 276 N.W. a t 856, 857-62. Ward
held the real estate broker liable for fraudulent misrepresentations to the buyer. 51 Cal.
2d a t 742, 336 P.2d a t 538.
68. 515 F.2d a t 25.
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The court also relied upon the trial testimony of two Idaho
real estate brokers that "a realtor who acts as an intermediary
between a seller and a prospective buyer has a duty not to compete secretly with and outbid the prospective buyer when that
buyer has made an offer on a piece of property and signed an
earnest-money purchase agreement."BgFurthermore, the court
found that requiring brokers to make adequate disclosure to prospective buyers was consistent with the "standards of the Idaho
real estate profession" and analogous to the disclosure requirements of various "statutory enactments designed to protect the
unknowing individual from the professional. ""The court concluded that imposing an obligation of disclosure on a broker who
wishes to compete with prospective purchasers benefits the seller
as well as the buyer. If a buyer is notified of the broker's competing offer, he may choose to better the broker's
Having found that Tifft had breached his fiduciary duty to
the Funks, the court reversed the trial court's dismissal and directed the imposition of a constructive trust in favor of the
In contrast, the dissenting opinion denied the existence of a
fiduciary relationship between Tifft and the Funks, and stated
that neither precedent nor the findings of the district court supported the court's finding of a fiduciary duty or breach.73Decisions from other jurisdictions were cited for the proposition that
"a broker for the seller can, with the seller's knowledge, outbid
prospective buyers . . . ."?' The cases relied upon by the majority were distinguished on the ground that they involved situations
in which the broker was the buyer's agent, made affirmative
69. Id.
70. Id. a t 25 n.2. The court cited three such statutes: The Truth in Lending Act, 15
U.S.C. $ § 1601-65 (1970); the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. 55
1701-20 (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C. $§ 1701-03 (Supp. IV, 1974); and the Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § $ 77a-77aa (1970).
71. 515 F.2d a t 25.
72. 515 F.2d a t 26. The court stated that:
[Tlhe Funks [had] established the essential elements required for the imposition of a constructive trust-the existence of a fiduciary relationship, its breach,
and the wrongful acquisition of the land by the breacher.
Id. (citation omitted). It is not necessary, however, to prove the existence of a fiduciary
relationship in order to impose a constructive trust. See note 32 supra.
73. 515 F.2d a t 27.
74. Id. The cases cited were Ries v. Rome, 337 Mass. 376, 149 N.E.2d 336 (1958);
Klotz v. Fauber, 213 Va. 1, 189 S.E.2d 45 (1972); and DiBurro v. Bonasia, 321 Mass. 12,
71 N.E.2d 401 (1947).
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misrepresentations, or underbid the prospective buyer's offer for
the property. The dissent concluded that
[wlhere the broker is not the agent of the prospective buyer,
where he acts with the knowledge of his principal, the seller,
where there is no misuse of confidential information, where
there is no fraudulent misrepresentation, and where the broker
bids more than any of the prospective buyers, there should be
no liability on the part of the broker if the seller chooses to
accept his offer without asking for another round of bids.75

The Ninth Circuit's decision in Funk u. Tifft significantly
extends real estate brokers' duties to potential buyers. As the
dissent pointed out, this is the first decision to hold a broker
liable for a breach of affirmative duties owing to a buyer in which
the broker was not the buyer's agent, did not conceal or fail to
communicate the buyer's offer, and did not make fraudulent or
deceitful misrepresentations.
The case of Quinn v. P h i p p ~ , ~ % p o nwhich the majority
placed chief reliance, is distinguishable both on its facts and on
its reasoning. The broker in Quinn had concealed the buyer's offer
and purchased the property for himself for less than the buyer's
bid after he had agreed not only to convey the offer, but also to
negotiate with the seller on the buyer's behalf. The broker in the
present case neither concealed the buyer's offer nor purchased the
property for a price lower than the buyer's bid. In addition, the
Quinn court in dictum indicated that if the broker and buyer
"had been dealing a t arm's length," then the broker "might not
have been bound by his agreement to purchase" for the buyer.77
In the present case, the broker had dealt a t arm's length with
several prospective purchasers, including the Funks.7R
The Ninth Circuit also relied upon two other distinguishable
cases:7YMitchell u. AllisonRDand Stephenson v. Golden? The
brokers in these two cases had been employed by the buyers, not
by the sellers. In contrast, an agency relationship between the
75
76
supra.
77
78
79
80
81.

Id. at 28.
93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419 (1927). Discussed notes 14-19 and accompanying text
93 Fla. at 816-17, 113 So. at 423.
515 F.2d at 28 (dissenting opinion).
See note 67 supra.
54 N.M. 56, 213 P.2d 231 (1949).
279 Mich. 710, 276 N.W. 849 (1937).
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broker and buyer did not exist in the present case. Tifft had been
employed by the seller and had disclosed to the Funks his agency
relationship with the seller.R2The Ninth Circuit further cited
Ward u. Taggart."% Ward, however, the broker had made fraudulent misrepresentations to the buyer. No such misrepresentations were made in Funk v. Tifft.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit's decision is not supported on its
facts by the cases cited in the opinion. Further difficulties with
the decision result from the court's finding of a fiduciary relationship between the parties and from the court's failure to place
necessary limitations on the scope of the broker's duties to the
buyer.

A . Source of the Broker's Duty: Fiduciary Relationship us.
Public Policy
As discussed above, the modern courts that have imposed
duties upon real estate brokers to prospective purchasers have
derived those duties either from a fiduciary relationship between
the broker and buyerR4or from public policy as expressed in particular state statutes.V'he Ninth Circuit concluded that a fiduciary relationship existed between Tifft and the Funks and held
Tifft liable for breach of his fiduciary duties to the Funks. The
court did not, however, articulate the basis for its conclusion that
a fiduciary relationship exists between a broker and a buyer. The
court simply asserted that a broker has a duty to be fair and
honest wtih a buyer and then appeared to derive this duty from
a fiduciary relationship between the parties?
The court found a fiduciary relationship between Tifft and
the Funks despite the fact that Tifft had been the seller's agent
prior to and during the time that he had dealt with the funk^.^'
As a result of his fiduciary relationship with the seller, Tifft's
duties to the seller included a duty to refrain from acting ad82. 515 F.2d a t 28 (dissenting opinion).
83. 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959).
84. Note 10 and accompanying text supra.
85. Note 11 and accompanying text supra.
86. It is not clear from the opinion whether the court intended to impose upon the
broker all the duties that evolve from a bona fide fiduciary relationship. The court held
that "Tifft did breach the fiduciary duties he owed the Funks." However, the court's next
statement appears to partially retract its finding of a fiduciary relationship: "When a real
estate broker acts as an intermediary between a seller and a prospective buyer, he is under
a duty to deal fairly and honestly with the prospective buyer." 515 F.2d at 25.
87. See notes 3, 12 supra.
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versely to the seller's interests in any manner, a duty to disclose
all information that might have affected the seller's position, and
a "duty to act aggressively and actively in furthering the [seller's] interest^."^^ It is unrealistic to expect the broker in a real
estate transaction to be able to fulfill these fiduciary duties of
utmost loyalty, care, and complete disclosure to both the buyer
and the seller.RgThe irreconcilable conflicts which would necessarily arise were a broker required to act in a fiduciary capacity
to two adverse parties would be further complicated if more than
one potential buyer chose to bid on the property.g0 On the other
hand, imposing a more limited duty on a real estate broker to deal
honestly and fairly with potential buyers would not conflict with
his agency relationship to the seller.g1
The Ninth Circuit did not discuss the Idaho Code or find that
public policy imposed affirmative duties on licensed real estate
brokers to be honest and fair in their dealings. Those states which
have held that brokers owe a duty of fairness and honesty to
buyers on grounds of public policy have relied on specific statutory provisions requiring brokers or applicants for brokerage licenses to be ethical, trustworthy, and of good c h a r a ~ t e rThe
.~~
Idaho Code does not include such express p r o v i ~ i o n sThe
. ~ ~ Code
does provide, however, that a broker may lose his license for any
"conduct . . . which constitutes dishonest or dishonorable dealings . . . ."" The court could have concluded that, by virtue of
the Idaho statutes that license and regulate real estate brokers, a
broker is "granted a form of monopolywg5and a status which
impose an ethical duty upon him to deal honestly and fairly with
all members of the public. In fact, had the court based its decision
88. 7 R. POWELL,
THELAWOF REALPROPERTY
7 938.13, a t 370.113 (1974).
89. See 35 BOST.U.L. REV.604, 607 (1955).
90. In Funk, several prospective buyers bid on the property. 515 F.2d at 28 (dissenting
opinion).
91. One commentator has suggested that courts should "recognize the fiduciary nature of the relationship between broker and buyer." He finds the public policy theory to
be an undesirably "vague and guideless standard,". while asserting that "[ulnder the
fiduciary approach the judiciary could examine new issues arising from broker-buyer
relationships in the light of the established and defined duties of a fiduciary . . . ." He
admits that finding a fiduciary relationship between the broker and buyer conflicts with
and impairs the broker's agency contract with the seller, but fails to give a satisfactory
solution for those inevitable conflicts. Comment, A Reexamination of the Real Estatc
Broker-Buyer-Seller Relationship, 18 WAYNEL. REV.1343, 1347-53 (1972).
92. See notes 35-53 and accompanying text supra.
93. IDAHOCODE§ § 54-2022 to 2051 (Supp. 1975).
94. Id. 8 54-2040(k).
95. Zichlin v. Dill, 157 Fla. 96, 98, 25 So. 2d 4, 4-5 (1946).
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on public policy rather than on a fiduciary relationship, it could
have avoided imposing the irreconcilable conflict of interest that
arises when a broker is required to act in a fiduciary capacity to
both adverse parties-buyer and seller-in a transaction.

B. Scope of the Broker's Duty: Prohibited from Competing us.
Required to Disclose
I t is clear that a real estate broker who has been hired by the
seller cannot act in a fiduciary capacity toward prospective buyers. If the broker's obligations to prospective buyers are restricted
to a duty to deal fairly and honestly, what does that duty require
of the broker when he desires to submit a competing bid on the
property? Unfortunately, the majority opinion does not clearly
define or limit the broker's responsibilities in such a situation.
Initially, the court states that the principal issue presented by the
case is whether a broker "owes a fiduciary duty to a prospective
buyer not to purchase a tract of land for himself while his pro~~
spective buyer's offer to buy that land is o u t ~ t a n d i n g . "The
majority goes on, however, to state that a broker's fiduciary duties of fairness and honesty are breached "when the real estate
agent outbids the prospective buyer without notice to him before
the seller has acted on his offer."97Then, the majority asserts that
the court is "merely giving force to the standards of the Idaho real
estate profes~ion,"~%utfails to clarify whether the standards of
the profession require that a broker not bid a t all on property for
the purchase of which other offers are outstanding or whether a
broker may compete with other prospective purchasers as long as
he makes "adequate disclosures." At best, then, the court leaves
confused the scope of a broker's duties when he wishes to compete
with a prospective purchaser.
A broker's obligation to deal honestly and fairly with potential buyers should not include an absolute duty to refrain from
submitting his own competing offer for real estate. The seller is
entitled to the best price possible for his property, no matter who
offers that price; indeed, when the broker is the seller's agent, he
has a fiduciary duty to agressively promote the seller's interests
by obtaining for the seller the highest bid on the property. Furthermore, since many real estate brokers are also in the business
- -

96. 515 F.2d a t 24.
97. Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
98. Id. a t 25 n.2.
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of investing in real estate, they should be allowed to compete
freely with others for property.Yg
There are, however, important reasons to impose a duty of
disclosure upon brokers who compete with prospective purchasers
to buy land. Inasmuch as a real estate broker is privy to confidential information-the price and terms of other prospective buyers'
offers-he has an unfair advantage in competing with those buyers. When a broker conveys a potential buyer's offer, the broker
should then be required to disclose to that buyer the price and
terms of any prior or subsequent offers he makes on the property.'") Article 12 of the Code of Ethics, published by the National
Association of Realtors, is consistent with this view:
The REALTOR shall not undertake to provide professional
services concerning a property or its value where he has a present or contemplated interest unless such interest is specifically
disclosed to all affected parties.In1

Although he cannot reasonably be expected to owe broad
fiduciary duties to both adverse parties to a transaction, when a
broker undertakes to communicate a prospective buyer's offer to
a seller, it is not unduly burdensome to require him to be responsible for the duties of fairness and honesty that arise in connection with that undertaking.lo2 Having agreed to convey the
buyer's offer, the broker's duty of fairness and honesty should
include a responsibility to fulfill the buyer's reasonable expectation that the broker will not take unfair advantage of that confi99. The actual purchaser of the property in Funk was a corporation. Shortly after
Funk had submitted his offer, another prospective buyer, Richard Kahn, was shown the
property by a salesman from the Tifft Agency. Mr. Kahn persuaded Tifft and his salesman
to form a corporation for the purpose of purchasing the property. Kahn contributed $4,200
of the downpayment and received 51% of the stock of the corporation. Tifft and his
salesman contributed their commission and received 24.5% of the corporate stock each.
At Kahn's request, Tifft telephoned the seller for her approval of the terms of their offer.
Kahn testified that he would have purchased the property alone but was interested in
having Tifft and his associate participate in the purchase in order to facilitate the subdivision and resale of the property. Record, vol. 11, a t 263-82, Funk v. Tifft, 515 F.2d 25 (9th
Cir. 1975).
100. See also Conant, Duties of Disclosure of Corporate Insiders Who Purchrrse
Shares, 46 CORNELL
L.Q. 53 (1960). The Securities and Exchange Commission and a
growing number of state courts have held that, because of his superior access to information, a purchasing corporate insider has an affirmative duty t o make disclosures to the
selling shareholder. Id. a t 72, 74. The corporate insider is not prevented from purchasing
outstanding shares, but he must make appropriate disclosures. Similarly, the real estate
broker should not be prevented from purchasing property, but should be required to make
appropriate disclosures. Cf. 515 F.2d a t 25 n.2.
101. J. LUMBLEAU,
THEREALESTATOR37 (2d ed. 1976).
102. See 35 BOST.U.L. REV.604, 608-09 (1955).
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dential information. A broker should be obligated not only to
communicate the buyer's offer faithfully and accurately, but also
to disclose to all potential buyers with whom he has dealt his
interest in, or his competing bid for, the property. As the court's
opinion in the present case notes, requiring the broker to make
such disclosures to the buyer also benefits the seller by helping
him obtain the best price for his property.lm Thus, a disclosure
requirement not only protects the interests of both the buyer and
the seller, but also allows the broker and the buyer to compete
on the same basis for the purchase of the property.

IV. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's decision in the present case is a reasonable extension of the duties imposed upon real estate brokers in
their dealings with buyers if it is interpreted as requiring a real
estate broker to disclose to those potential buyers his interest in
the property and any competing bids he submits on the property.
Such a disclosure requirement is beneficial to both the buyer and
holding
the seller. It is submitted, however, that the Funk u. Tifft
should not be interpreted broadly to impose upon the broker in
his dealings with potential buyers the fiduciary duties of utmost
loyalty, care, and complete disclosure that are traditionally associated only with true agency relationships. An imposition of such
fiduciary obligations on the broker would conflict with his agency
relationship with the seller and would prevent the broker from
competing to purchase the property.

